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INTRODUCTION 
Securities fraud litigation under Rule lOb-51 threatens all pub­
licly traded companies: according to the Stanford Securities Class 
Action Clearinghouse, in 1998 a securities fraud lawsuit was filed 
for nearly every day that the stock markets were open.2 Some of 
these lawsuits appear to be frivolous, triggered by inevitable fluctu­
ations in stock prices (so-called "fraud by hindsight" complaints3), 
while others represent legitimate efforts at private enforcement of 
the securities laws.4 
1. Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1998), prohibits "manipulative and deceptive de­
vices . . .  in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." It was promulgated by the 
Securities Exchange Commission ("SEC" or "Commission") under § lO(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934. See 7 Louis Loss & JoEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 3485-
88 (3d ed. 1997). 
2. Securities Fraud Litigation Sets Record in 1998: Companies Sued at a Rate Close to 
One-A-Day (visited Feb. 6, 1998) <http://securities.stanford.edu/news/990125/pressrel.html>. 
The Stanford Securities Class Action Clearinghouse, at http://securities.stanford.edu, re­
ports active federal securities class action lawsuits, and new suits are posted daily. To counter 
the perceived defense bias at the Stanford site, Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach (by 
volume the largest plaintiffs' class action securities fraud firm) sponsors its own web site, at 
http://www.milberg.com, which also reports ongoing suits and contains press releases from 
Milberg Weiss. 
3. See OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, U.S. SEc. & ExCH. CoMMN., REPORT To THE 
PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS ON THE FIRST YEAR OF PRAcnCE UNDER THE PRIVATE 
SECURITIES LmGATION REFORM Acr OF 1995, at 6 (1997) [hereinafter SEC REPORT]. 
4. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 
730 (Statement of Managers - The "Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995") 
[hereinafter "Statement of Managers"] ("Private securities litigation is an indispensable tool 
with which defrauded investors can recover their losses without having to rely upon govern­
ment action. Such private lawsuits promote public and global confidence in our capital mar­
kets and help to deter wrongdoing and to guarantee that corporate officers, auditors, 
directors, lawyers and others properly perform their jobs."). Even though the Commission 
never envisioned civil liability when it promulgated Rule lOb-5, see Loss & SELIGMAN, supra 
note 1, at 3487, most securities fraud plaintiffs bring suit under Rule lOb-5 rather than § 18 of 
the Securities Exchange Act because Rule lOb-5 is considerably more liberal than § 18. See 
JAMES D. Cox ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 677 (2d ed. 1997). 
The Conference Committee Report for the Reform Act is broken into a recitation of the 
text of the bill and a "Statement of Managers." The Statement of Managers contains the 
relevant legislative history, and courts considering the Reform Act tend to identify it as the 
"Statement of Managers" rather than as the "Conference Committee Report." This Note 
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Disposition on the pleadings is a critical defense strategy for all 
securities lawsuits. Securities fraud lawsuits that withstand a 
12(b )( 6) motion almost always settle, regardless of the actual merits 
of the case or the probability of success at trial,5 because of the 
massive discovery and defense costs associated with such suits.6 
Because Rule lOb-5 requires a showing of scienter, a mental state 
embracing "intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud,"7 defendants 
can often successfully dispose of a securities fraud case before being 
forced to settle by challenging the plaintiff's scienter pleading.8 For 
these reasons, the standard for pleading scienter is an appropriate 
context in which to balance the competing interests of eliminating 
abusive claims and permitting meritorious ones.9 
Prior to the passage of the Private Securities Litigation Reform 
Act of 1995 ("Reform Act"),10 the federal circuit courts of appeals 
had varying interpretations of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
9(b )'s11 application to pleading scienter in a securities fraud law­
suit.12 The Ninth Circuit's standard was quite liberal, while the 
will follow the stylistic convention of the majority of courts, and generally refer to the "State­
ment of Managers." 
5. Statement of Managers, supra note 4, at 32 ("[I]nnocent parties are often forced to pay 
exorbitant 'settlements.' When an [issuer] must pay lawyers' fees, make settlement pay­
ments, and expend management and employee resources in defending a meritless suit, the 
issuers' own investors suffer. Investors always are the ultimate losers when extortionate 'set­
tlements' are extracted from issuers."). 
6. See S. REP. No. 104-98, at 6 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S. C. C.A.N. 679, 685 ("The 
dynamics of private securities litigation create powerful incentives to settle, causing securities 
class actions to have a much higher settlement rate than other types of class actions . . . .  The 
settlement value to defendants turns more on the expected costs of defense than the merits of 
the underlying claim."); see also Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739 
(1975); Securities Litigation Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Telecomms. and Fin. 
of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Congress 35-36 (1994) (statement of 
SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt); H.R. REP. No. 104-50, pt. 1, at 15 (1995). 
7. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976). Rule lOb-5 on its face contains 
no explicit scienter requirement, but the Supreme Court inferred one in Ernst & Ernst. 
8. Cf. Common Sense Legal Reform Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecomms. 
and Fin. of the House Comm on Commerce, 104th Cong. 199 (1995) (testimony of Arthur 
Levitt, SEC Chairman) (describing Rule 9(b) challenges as "[t]he device most frequently 
used to screen out deficient securities fraud claims"). 
9. See In re Tnne Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 264 (2d Cir. 1993) (observing that an 
overly rigid standard will create "opportunity for unremedied fraud," while an overly lax 
standard will create "opportunity to extract an undeserved settlement"); City of Painesville v. 
First Montauk Fm., Corp., 178 F.R.D. 180, 187 (N.D. Ohio 1998). 
10. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 
U.S. C.). 
11. FED. R. Crv. P. 9(b) ("In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances consti­
tuting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, and 
other condition of m¥td of a person may be averred generally."). 
12. Each circuit had articulated some common law pleading standard. For example, the 
Frrst Circuit required, plaintiffs to plead facts with such particularity as to make it reasonable 
to believe that the defendant acted with scienter. See, e.g., Greenstone v. Cambex Corp., 975 
F.2d 22, 25 (1st Cir. 1��2). The Second Circuit required plaintiffs to plead facts giving rise to 
a strong inference
. 
of.scienter., See, e.g., O'Brien v. National Property Analysts Partners, 936 
2268 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 97:2265 
Second Circuit's standard was quite strict. The Second Circuit re­
quired facts giving rise to a "strong inference" of scienter and per­
mitted two approaches to pleading such facts: alleging facts 
establishing both motive and opportunity to commit fraud, or alleg­
ing facts sufficient to demonstrate circumstantial evidence of reck­
less or conscious wrongdoing.13 
Because most corporate defendants are subject to personal ju­
risdiction in a variety of places, the variance among the circuits 
(particularly the lax Ninth Circuit standard), created strong incen­
tives for forum shopping and abuse. To address those concerns,14 
Congress drafted the Reform Act in 1995 and passed it over 
President Clinton's veto in December of that year.1s The key text 
of the Reform Act, for purposes of this Note, is section 21D(b )(2) 
- "Required State of Mind," which provides that: 
In any private action arising under this chapter in which the plaintiff 
may recover money damages only on proof that the defendant acted 
with a particular state of mind, the complaint shall, with respect to 
each act or omission alleged to violate this chapter, state with particu­
larity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted 
with the required state of mind.16 
Federal district courts have exhibited confusion about the mean­
ing of § 21D(b )(2), and the federal circuit courts of appeals have 
divided on the issue.17 As one judge has noted, "widespread dis­
agreement on the requirements of scienter permeates the federal 
F.2d 674, 676 (2d Cir. 1991). The Third Circuit followed the Second. See, e.g., In re 
Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1418 (3d Cir. 1997) (noting absence of law 
in the Third Circuit prior to 1995 Reform Act and approving Second Circuit's standard for 
use in cases not governed by the Reform Act). In re Burlington Coat Factory arose before 
the effective date of the Reform Act. See 114 F.3d at 1418 n.6. The Ninth Circuit permitted 
plaintiffs to plead the allegedly false or misleading statements and why they were false or 
misleading. Plaintiffs were permitted to aver scienter generally. See, e.g., In re Glenfed Inc. 
Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1546, 1548-49 (9th Cir. 1994) (en bane). 
13. See Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir. 1994); In re Time 
Warner, 9 F.3d at 268-69. This discussion focuses on the Second Circuit's case law because 
Congress focused on that case law when it undertook legislation on this issue. 
14. See Powers v. Eichen, 977 F. Supp. 1031, 1038 (S.D. Cal. 1997) ("The PSLRA effec­
tively overturned the Ninth Circuit's lenient scienter pleading requirement • . . .  "). 
15. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 
737, 765 n.5 (enumerating the dates upon which the President vetoed the Act and both the 
House and Senate overrode his veto). 
16. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, § 21D(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-
4(b)(2) (Supp. ill 1997). 
17. There are currently four circuit court opinions addressing this issue. 1\vo, Press v. 
Chemical Inv. Services, Corp., 166 F.3d 529 (2d Cir. 1999) and Williams v. WMX 
Technologies, 112 F.3d 175 (5th Cir. 1997) assume without argument that the Reform Act 
codified the Second Circuit's pleading standard. The Third Circuit reached the same conclu­
sion in In re Advanta Securities Litigation, No. 98-1846, 1999 WL 395997, at *7 (3d Cir. June 
17, 1999). The Advanta court reviewed the legislative history in great detail, including the 
legislative history for the Uniform Standards Act (discussed infra notes 75-80 and accompa­
nying text), but ultimately concluded that "there is little to gain in attempting to reconcile the 
conflicting expressions of legislative intent." Advanta, 1999 WL 395997, at *7. The Third 
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court system."18 Although § 21D(b )(2) adopts the Second Circuit's 
pleading standard verbatim - "facts giving rise to a strong infer­
ence" of scienter - it does not speak directly to the tests that the 
Second Circuit developed to explain that standard. Specifically, 
two issues remain unresolved. First, it is unclear whether a plaintiff 
may adequately plead scienter by pleading both motive and oppor­
tunity. Second, it is unclear whether or not a plaintiff may ade­
quately plead scienter by pleading circumstantial evidence of 
reckless conduct. 
To address this confusion, it is helpful to distinguish between the 
Second Circuit's pleading standard and the tests developed by the 
Second Circuit to explain that standard. While some cases use the 
two concepts interchangeably,19 this Note reserves the terms 
"pleading standard" and "standard" for the requirement that plead­
ings raise a strong inference of scienter. This Note reserves the 
term "tests" to refer to the Second Circuit's explanation of the ways 
a plaintiff might demonstrate compliance with the pleading stan­
dard - a showing of motive and opportunity or a showing of cir­
cumstantial evidence indicating conscious or reckless wrongdoing. 
Federal courts have sharply divided over the question of how 
section 21D(b )(2) is to be interpreted. The central district of 
California, in Marksman Partners v. Chantal Pharmaceutical Corp., 
has read the plain language of section 21D(b )(2) and its accompa­
nying legislative history to mean that Congress chose to codify both 
the Second Circuit's motive and opportunity test and its circum­
stantial evidence of recklessness tests.20 The Marksman rule has 
Circuit therefore held that the plain language of the Reform Act, by incorporating the lan­
guage of the Second Circuit's standard, also incorporated its tests. 1999 WL 395997, at *7. 
The Ninth Circuit, in In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Securities Litigation, Nos. 97-16204 & 97-
16240, 1999 WL 446521, at *1 {9th Cir. July 2, 1999), analyzed the legislative history, and 
concluded that the Reform Act required plaintiffs to plead "in great detail, facts that consti­
tute circumstantial evidence of deliberately reckless or conscious misconduct." The opinion 
essentially tracks the analysis of the District Court opinion, In re Silicon Graphics Inc. 
Securities Litigation, No. C 97-0494, 1996 WL 664639, at *6-7 {N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 1996). In 
brief summary, the Ninth Circuit reached its holding by emphasizing elements in the legisla­
tive history suggesting that Congress intended to raise the pleading standard nationwide. 
Since the Second Circuit standard was in place when the Reform Act was enacted, the court 
reasoned, the Reform Act must impose requirements more strict than those imposed by the 
Second Circuit. See In re Silicon Graphics 1999 WL 446521, at *5. For a response to this 
reasoning, see infra note 116 and accompanying text. 
18. Chan v. Orthologic Corp., No. CIV-96-1514-PHX-RCS, at 19, (D. Ariz. Feb. 5, 1998) 
(Broomfield, J .)  (available at the Stanford Securities Litigation Clearinghouse 
{http://securities.stanford.edu) ). 
19. When such cases rely upon portions of the legislative history stating that the Reform 
Act codified the pleading standard for the proposition that the Reform Act codified the tests, 
this Note cites such cases verbatim, even at the risk of causing confusion. The use of "stan­
dard" and "test" by the cases does not necessarily track this Note's usage of those terms - in 
fact, part of this Note's argument is that some cases often mistake legislative history referring 
to the standards for evidence of codification of the tests. 
20. 927 F. Supp. 1297, 1309-13 (C.D. Cal. 1996). 
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been widely followed by other districts,21 and essentially embraced 
by the Second, Third, and Fifth Circuits.22 The Northern District of 
California, by contrast, in In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Securities 
Litigation, viewed the same sources as evidence that the Reform 
Act rejected the Second Circuit's tests in favor of a higher pleading 
standard still - requiring that a plaintiff plead facts demonstrating 
circumstantial evidence of conscious wrongdoing.23 The Silicon 
Graphics rule has also found a wide following,24 and has been af­
firmed by the Ninth Circuit.25 
This Note concurs with a third group of cases, led by In re Baesa 
Securities Litigation, 26 that have held that the Reform Act neither 
codifies nor repudiates the Second Circuit's tests, but merely codi­
fies the pleading standard and requires courts to evaluate specific 
pleadings on a case-by-case basis.27 Some commentators misunder-
21. See, e.g., Gifford Partners, L.P. v. Sensormatic Elecs. Corp., No. 96 C 4072, 1997 WL 
757495, at *18 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 24, 1997); OnBank & Trust Co. v. FDIC, 967 F. Supp. 81, 88 n.4 
(W.D.N.Y. 1997); Pilarczyk v. Morrison Knudsen Corp., 965 F. Supp. 311, 320 n.8 (N.D.N.Y. 
1997), affd. per curiam, No. 97-7821, 1998 WL 640447 (2d Cir. Apr. 6, 1998); Page v. 
Derrickson, No. 96-842-CIV-T-17C, 1997 WL 148558, at *9 & n.5 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 25, 1997); 
Fugman v. Aprogenex, Inc., 961 F. Supp. 1190, 1195 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Rehm v. Eagle Fin. 
Corp., 954 F. Supp. 1246, 1252 (N.D. Ill. 1997); STI Classic Fund v. Bollinger Indus., No. 3-
96-CV-823-R, 1996 WL 885802, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 25, 1996); Zeid v. Kimberley, 930 F. 
Supp. 431, 438 (N.D. Cal. 1996). 
22. See In re Advanta Sec. Litig., No. 98-1846, 1999 WL 395997, at *7 (3d Cir. June 17, 
1999); Press v. Chemical Inv. Servs., Corp., 166 F.3d 529 (2d Cir. 1999); Williams v. WMX 
Techs., 112 F.3d 175 (5th Cir. 1997). 
23. In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C 96-0393, 1996 WL 664639, at *6-7 (N.D. 
Cal. Sept. 25, 1996) (holding that the Reform Act requires plaintiffs to allege "specific facts 
that constitute circumstantial evidence of conscious behavior by defendants"). 
24. See, e.g., Voit v. Wonderware Corp., 977 F. Supp. 363, 374 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (approving 
Norwood and Friedberg); Press v. Quick & Reilly, No. 96 CIV. 4278 (RPP), 1997 WL 458666, 
at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 1997) (holding that motive and opportunity alone are not sufficient 
- additional facts must also be pleaded giving rise to a strong inference of scienter); 
Norwood Venture Corp. v. Converse, Inc., 959 F. Supp. 205, 208 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding 
that Congress intended to raise the pleading standard above that of the Second Circuit); 
Powers v. Eichen, 977 F. Supp. 1031, 1038-39 (S.D. Cal. 1997) (approving Silicon Graphics); 
Friedberg v. Discreet Logic Inc., 959 F. Supp. 42, 48 (D. Mass. 1997) (rejecting motive and 
opportunity based on Conference Committee Report). 
25. See In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., Nos. 97-16204 & 97-16240, 1999 WL 446521, 
at *1 (9th Cir. July 2, 1999). 
26. 969 F. Supp. 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
27. See In re Baesa, 969 F. Supp. at 242 ("[U]nder the Reform Act, and in contrast to 
prior Second Circuit precedent, [particulars regarding motive and opportunity] are not pre­
sumed sufficient [to raise a strong inference of scienter]. Rather . . .  the pleadings must set 
forth sufficient particulars, of whatever kind, to raise a strong inference of the required scien­
ter." (footnote omitted)); see also Malin v. IVAX Corp., 77 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1357 (S.D. Fla. 
1998) (approving In re Baesa); Queen Uno Ltd. Partnership v. Coeur D'Alene Mines Corp., 
2 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1359 (D. Colo. 1998) (approving In re Baesa and In re Health Manage· 
ment); In re Stratosphere Corp. Sec. Litig., 1 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1107-08 (D. Nev. 1998) (ap­
proving In re Baesa); In re Health Management, Inc. Sec. Litig., 970 F. Supp. 192, 201 
(E.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that a plaintiff may raise a strong inference by "pleading motive 
and opportunity, conscious misbehavior, recklessness or by impressing upon the court a 
novel legal theory"). 
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stand the Baesa holding as rejecting motive and opportunity show­
ings.28 When properly understood and read in light of subsequent 
cases in the Baesa line,29 however, the Baesa rule merely requires 
courts to evaluate a plaintiff's factual allegations neutrally. Courts 
should have no presumptions in favor of or against fixed formalistic 
categories such as "motive and opportunity," and should determine 
on a case-by-case basis whether or not plaintiffs' pleadings raise a 
strong inference of scienter. 
This Note argues that the Reform Act neither codified nor pro­
hibited the Second Circuit's tests, but merely codified the Second 
Circuit's pleading standard and left courts to apply the standard on 
a case-by-case basis.30 The Reform Act essentially shifted the locus 
of uncertainty away from the various tests in various circuits - mo­
tive and opportunity, circumstantial evidence of recklessness - to 
28. One commentator misreads Baesa as holding that a showing of motive and opportu­
nity is facially insufficient to meet the Reform Act formulation. Compare Ryan G. Miest, 
Note, Would the Real Scienter Please Stand Up: The Effect of the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995 on Pleading Securities Fraud, 82 MINN. L. REv. 1103, 1126 (1998) ("The 
Second Circuit's motive and opportunity test is inconsistent with this focus [on unifying and 
strengthening procedural pleading standards] and should not be applied under 21D(b)(2).") 
and id. at 1128 ("The Baesa standard ... eliminates motive and opportunity as an alternative 
pleading method .... ") with In re Baesa, 969 F. Supp. at 242 ("This, of course, does not mean 
that particulars regarding motive and opportunity may not be relevant to pleading circum­
stances from which a strong inference of fraudulent scienter may be inferred. In some cases, 
they may even be sufficient by themselves to do so. But, under the Reform Act ... they are 
not presumed sufficient to do so. Rather, under the Reform Act formulation, the pleadings 
must set forth sufficient particulars, of whatever kind, to raise a strong inference of the re­
quired scienter." (footnote omitted) (emphasis added)). 
For a more plaintiff-oriented view of the Reform Act, see William S. LeRach & Eric Alan 
Isaacson, Pleading Scienter Under Section 21D(b)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: 
Motive, Opportunity, Recklessness, and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 
33 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 893 (1996). 
29. Even if Baesa did take such a harsh view of motive and opportunity showings, later 
cases in the Baesa line have clarified the continuing relevance of motive and opportunity. 
See, e.g., In re Stratosphere, 1 F. Supp. 2d at 1107 ("[M]otive and opportunity ... in some 
cases ... may be sufficiently strong standing alone."); Queen Uno, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 1359 ("[I]n 
occasional cases the inference drawn solely from motive and opportunity allegations will ... 
be sufficiently strong to withstand a motion to dismiss .... "); Malin, 17 F. Supp. 2d at 1357 
(approving statement in Baesa that "[i]n some cases [particulars regarding motive and oppor­
tunity] may even be sufficient by themselves to [raise a strong inference of scienter] " (quot­
ing In re Baesa, 969 F. Supp. at 242)). 
30. One commentator takes the remarkable position that the Reform Act simultaneously 
codified the Second Circuit tests and refrained from imposing any presumption either for or 
against the motive and opportunity test - a conclusion that essentially endorses both 
Marksman and Baesa. Michael B. Dunn, Note, Pleading Scienter After the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act: Or, a Textualist Revenge, 84 CORNELL L. REv. 193, 250 (1998) ("De­
ciding courts ... may ... apply both of [the Second Circuit's] tests unaltered; they may ... 
eliminat[e] the presumption that pleading motive and opportunity suffices to establish a 
strong inference and measure the weight of such evidence on a case-by-case basis; or alterna­
tively, they may develop novel requirements and tests by which to satisfy the strong inference 
pleading standard."). Rather than concluding that virtually any reading of the Reform Act 
other than Silicon Graphics must be correct, this Note will argue that the Silicon Graphics 
court was at least correct on one point: the Congress unambiguously did not leave the door 
open for rote application of the Second Circuit tests. 
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the ultimate question of whether or not a plaintiff has raised a 
strong inference of scienter. The Baesa rule serves the heuristic 
function of reminding courts that the standard is central and the 
tests are peripheral; the formalism of the tests cannot be allowed to 
distract attention from the ultimate inquiry mandated by the stan­
dard. Part I argues, contrary to Marksman, that while the Reform 
Act codified the Second Circuit's pleading standard, it did not cod­
ify the associated tests. Part II argues, contrary to Silicon Graphics, 
that the Reform Act also did not repudiate those tests or prohibit 
courts from using them. Part III then embraces the Baesa rule, ar­
guing that the same plain language and legislative history argu­
ments that undercut both the Marksman and the Silicon Graphics 
rules compel the Baesa rule. 
I. CONGRESS DID NOT CODIFY EITHER THE MOTIVE AND 
OPPORTUNITY TEST OR THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL 
EVIDENCE OF RECKLESSNESS TEST 
Although Congress did codify the Second Circuit's pleading 
standard, it did not codify either the motive and opportunity test or 
the circumstantial evidence of recklessness test. This Part rejects 
the Marksman rule, which holds that the Reform Act's adoption of 
the Second Circuit's pleading standard implicitly codified both the 
motive and opportunity test and the circumstantial evidence of 
recklessness test.31 Section I.A contends that the plain language of 
the Reform Act, as well as much of its legislative history, indicates 
codification of only the pleading standard, not the tests. Section I.B 
points out that the deletion of Senator Specter's amendment (which 
would have expressly codified a simplistic version of the Second 
Circuit's tests) by the Conference Committee conclusively refutes 
the Marksman rule. 
A. The Reform Act Merely Codifi.ed the Second Circuit's 
Pleading Standard 
The Reform Act on its face codifies the Second Circuit's plead­
ing standard. The Reform Act demands that plaintiffs "state with 
particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant 
acted with [scienter],"32 while the Second Circuit formerly de­
manded that "facts alleged in the complaint must 'give[ ] ... rise to 
31. See Marksman Partners v. Chantal Pharm. Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1297, 1309-11, 1313 
{C.D. Cal. 1996). 
32. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 § 21D{b )(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b )(2) 
(Supp. III 1997) (emphasis added). 
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a 'strong inference' of fraudulent intent."'33 This similarity is not 
accidental according to the legislative history.34 The Senate Report 
denied adopting "a new and untested pleading standard that would 
generate additional litigation," and conceded that the standard in 
the draft legislation was "modeled upon the pleading standard of 
the Second Circuit."35 
The fact that the Reform Act codified the pleading standard 
does not, however, prove that the Act also codified the tests. Sec­
tion 21D(b )(2) says nothing about the tests.36 If the Reform Act 
codified those tests, one might reasonably expect them to appear 
somewhere in the statute, yet they are conspicuously absent. The 
Conference Committee report recognizes this deliberate omission 
when it emphasizes that "[t]he Conference Committee language is 
based in part on the pleading standard of the Second Circuit," and 
"[the Committee] does not intend to codify the Second Circuit's 
case law interpreting this pleading standard."37 The report's repu­
diation of the Marksman rule is compelling because the Supreme 
Court has identified conference committee reports as "the authori­
tative source for finding the Legislature's intent"38 in part because 
they are the only documents that involve the collective understand­
ing of both houses of Congress.39 Furthermore, the legislative his­
tory outside of the Conference Committee report is essentially a 
wash, with comments from the Act's sponsors specifically disclaim-
33. In re Tune Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 268 (2d Cir. 1993) (alteration in origi­
nal) (emphasis added) (quoting O'Brien v. Natl. Property Analysts Partners, 936 F.2d 674, 
676 (2d Cir. 1991)). 
34. Legislative history is particularly essential when, as here, the plain text of the statute 
is remarkably sparse and the text itself adopts a judicially constructed standard. Contempo­
rary criticisms to the contrary notwithstanding, legislative history remains an appropriate aid 
to statutory construction. For a comprehensive review and response to criticisms of judicial 
use of legislative history, see Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpret­
ing Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 845 (1991). 
35. S. REP. No. 104-98, at 15 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 694; see also 141 
CONG. REc. S17,966 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch) ("[T]he legislation 
adopts the [S]econd [C]ircuit pleading standard . . . .  "). 
36. See Novak v. Kasaks, 997 F. Supp. 425, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) ("[H]ad Congress wished 
to adopt the 'motive and opportunity' prong of the Second Circuit standard, it would have 
said so."). 
37. Statement of Managers, supra note 4, at 41. 
38. Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984). 
39. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 76 (quoting Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 186 (1969)). Note 
that the Conference Committee Report trumps floor debates. The Court has "eschewed reli­
ance on the passing comments of one Member [of Congress] and casual statements from the 
floor debates" in favor of the Conference Report. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 76 (citation omitted). 
Further, the Conference Committee Report trumps the House and Senate reports. See 
Demby v. Schweiker, 671 F.2d 507, 510 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("Because the conference report 
represents the final statement of terms agreed to by both houses, next to the statute itself it is 
the most persuasive evidence of congressional intent."). 
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ing codification of the Second Circuit's tests40 balancing out any 
comments consistent with the Marksman rule.41 Finally, the fact 
that the Congress fully intended the Second Circuit's case law to be 
available for reference, not as binding statutory authority but as in­
structive persuasive authority,42 accounts for most pro-Marksman 
comments. 
B. The Deletion of Senator Specter's Proposed Amendment 
Conclusively Proves That the Reform Act Did Not 
Codify the Second Circuit's Tests 
Any inference that the Second Circuit's tests were codified by 
implication43 is disproven by the specific deletion of Senator 
Specter's proposed amendment. The Supreme Court has held that 
when a conference committee explicitly considers and then rejects 
text - for example, by deleting a portion of a bill in conference -
that consideration and rejection is compelling evidence of legisla­
tive intent and precludes interpretations that would reach the de­
leted result by implication.44 This rule is precisely applicable to the 
Reform Act. 
40. See 141 CoNG. REc. S19,149 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 1995) (statement of Sen. Bradley) 
("In fact, the language of the bill does codify the [S]econd [C]ircuit standard in part - and 
the statement of managers says so . . . .  [T]he conference report deliberately rejects a complete 
codification of the [S]econd [C]ircuit and adopts language which is substantially similar to the 
language in the Senate-passed bill . . . .  " (emphasis added)); see also Memorandum from 
Professor Joseph A. Grundfest of the Stanford Law School and former Commissioner of the 
SE C to President William J. Clinton (Dec. 19, 1995), reprinted in 141 CONG. REc. Sl9,067-68 
(daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) [hereinafter Grundfest memorandum] ("As I read the securities 
litigation conference report, the pleading standard is faithful to the Second Circuit's test. 
Indeed, I concur with the decision to eliminate the Specter amendment language, which was 
an incomplete and inaccurate codification of case law in the circuit."). 
41. For example, Representative Lofgren essentially endorsed the Marksman result dur­
ing the veto override debates. See 141 CONG. REc. H15,219 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995) (state­
ment of Rep. Lofgren). Senator Dodd reached a similar conclusion during the Senate 
override debates. See 141 CONG. REc. S17,959 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of Sen. 
Dodd). Although both Lofgren and Dodd spoke of the Second Circuit's standard, their com­
ments are typically taken (at least by plaintiffs' lawyers) as support for the Marksman rule. 
See, e.g., Appellants' Opening Brief at 42, 43 n.20, In re Silicon Graphics Sec. Litig., (9th Cir. 
1997) (No. 97-16240). 
42. See S. REP. No. 104-98, at 15 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C. C.A.N. 679, 694 ("The 
Committee does not intend to codify the Second Circuit's caselaw interpreting this pleading 
standard, although courts may find this body of law instructive."). 
43. See, e.g., In re Advanta Sec. Litig., No. 98-1846, 1999 WL 395997, at *7 (3d Cir. June 
17, 1999) ("We believe Congress's use of the Second Circuit's language compels the conclu­
sion that the Reform Act establishes a pleading standard approximately equal in stringency 
to that of the Second Circuit."); Rehm v. Eagle Fm. Corp., 954 F. Supp. 1246, 1252 (N.D. Ill. 
1997) (inferring incorporation of the tests from Congress's decision "to incorporate verbatim 
the language of the Second Circuit Rule 9(b) standard"). 
44. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonesca, 480 U.S. 421, 442-43 (1986) ("Few principles of statutory 
construction are more compelling than the proposition that Congress does not intend sub 
silentio to enact statutory language that it has earlier discarded in favor of other language." 
(quoting Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 392-93 (1980) 
(Stewart, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving 
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The Senate version of the Reform Act, S. 240, included an 
amendment originally proposed by Senator Specter. The Specter 
amendment would have replaced section 21D(b )(2) with the 
following: 
(b) REQUIRED STATE OF MIND. -
(1) IN GENERAL. - • • •  [T]he complaint shall . . .  specifi­
cally allege facts giving rise to a strong inference that 
the defendant acted with the required state of mind. 
(2) STRONG INFERENCE OF FRAUDULENT INTENT. - For 
purposes of paragraph (1), a strong inference that the 
defendant acted with the required state of mind may be 
established either -
(A) by alleging facts to show that the defendant 
had both motive and opportunity to commit fraud; 
or 
(B) by alleging facts that constitute strong circum­
stantial evidence of conscious misbehavior or reck­
lessness by the defendant.45 
Subparagraph (2)(A) would have codified the motive and opportu­
nity test and subparagraph (2)(B) would have codified the circum­
stantial evidence of recklessness test. The Specter amendment 
passed the Senate, and was part of the bill that the Senate sent to 
the Conference Committee. The Conference Committee removed 
the amendment,46 compelling the conclusion that they did not in­
tend to codify the Second Circuit's tests by implication. 
The sponsors of the bill explained their intention in removing 
the Specter amendment. In the floor debates on the Conference 
Committee Report, Senator Specter inquired about the disappear­
ance of his amendment, and Senator Dodd (one of the bill's manag­
ers) explained the Conference Committee's rationale: 
Basically, what we intended to do here was to codify the [S]econd 
[C]ircuit's pleadings standards, not to indicate disapproval of each in-
dividual case that came before it .. . . 
. . . [T]he Banking Committee .. . does not intend before we con-
sider the bill to codify the [S]econd [C]ircuit's case law interpreting 
this pleading standard, although courts may find this body [of] law 
instructive.47 
Co., 419 U.S. 186, 200 (1974) (holding that a conference committee's deletion of a phrase 
from a bill that is later passed "strongly militates against a judgment that Congress intended a 
result that it expressly declined to enact"); see also Brief of the American Electronics 
Association, Amicus Curiae at 12, In re Silicon Graphics Sec. Litig., (9th Cir. 1997) (No. 97-
16240). 
45. 141 CONG. REc. S9,170 (daily ed. June 27, 1995) (Amendment No. 1485). 
46. See 141 CoNG. REc. Sl7,959 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of Sen. Specter) 
("The conference report struck out the language which my amendment had inserted which 
would have given guidance to how plaintiffs could meet that very stringent standard."). 
47. 141 CoNG. REc. Sl7,960 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dodd) (emphasis 
added). Following the quoted language, Senator Dodd also explained that: 
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Senator Dodd expressly confirms the obvious inference - the 
Conference Committee did not intend to codify Senator Specter's 
articulation of the Second Circuit's tests, and therefore removed 
language that would have done so, leaving only language that codi­
fies the "strong inference of scienter" standard.48 
* * * 
The Reform Act did not codify either the Second Circuit's mo­
tive and opportunity test or circumstantial evidence of recklessness 
test. The plain text of the Act and its legislative history make that 
clear, as does the deletion of the Specter amendment. 
II. CONGRESS DID NOT REPUDIATE EITHER THE MOTIVE AND 
OPPORTUNITY TEST OR THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL 
EVIDENCE OF RECKLESSNESS TEST 
Although not codified by the Reform Act, the Second Circuit's 
tests may still guide courts in their case-by-case evaluations of 
plaintiffs' pleadings. The Silicon Graphics court held that the mo­
tive and opportunity test and the circumstantial evidence of reck­
lessness test were repudiated by the Reform Act, with the result 
that plaintiffs must plead circumstantial evidence of conscious 
wrongdoing.49 This argument typically relies upon footnote 23 in 
the Statement of Managers, which states that "the Conference 
Report chose not to include in the pleading standard certain lan­
guage relating to motive, opportunity, or recklessness."50 This Part 
The Senator's amendment adopted the guidance of the [S]econd [C]ircuit, but the 
amendment of the Senator from Pennsylvania completely omits a critical qualification in 
the case law. The courts have held that "where motive is not apparent, a plaintiff may 
plead scienter by identifying circumstances" indicating wrongful behavior, but "the 
strength of the circumstantial allegations must be correspondingly greater" from the 
number of cases. 
141 CoNG. REc. S17,960 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dodd). In other words, 
the rationale for removing Senator Specter's amendment was that the amendment failed to 
clarify the full effect that the presence or absence of motive and opportunity has upon a 
plaintiff's showing. The Committee did not reason that motive and opportunity are now 
irrelevant - to the contrary, the Specter amendment failed to capture the full extent to 
which motive and opportunity are relevant. 
48. In re Advanta Sec. Litig., No. 98-1846, 1999 WL 395997, at *7 (3d Cir. June 17, 1999) 
("[I]f Congress had desired to eliminate motive and opportunity or recklessness as a basis for 
scienter, it could have done so expressly in the text of the Reform Act. In our view, the fact 
that Congress considered inserting language directly addressing this line of cases, but ulti­
mately chose not to, suggests that it intended to leave the matter to judicial interpretation."); 
In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., Nos. 97-16204 & 997-16240, 1999 WL 446521, at *20 
(9th Cir. July 2, 1999) (Browning, J., concurring and dissenting) (citing Advanta for the same 
point). 
49. In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C 96-0393, 1996 WL 664639, at *6-7 (N.D. 
Cal. Sept. 25, 1996) (holding that the Reform Act requires plaintiffs to "allege specific facts 
that constitute circumstantial evidence of conscious behavior by defendants"). 
50. Statement of Managers, supra note 4, at 48 n.23. The Statement of Managers is the 
Conference Committee Report for the Reform Act. For examples of reliance upon footnote 
23 for the proposition that the Reform Act raised the pleading standard above that of the 
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rejects the Silicon Graphics rule. Section II.A argues that the plain 
language of the statute and the contemporaneous legislative history 
support the proposition that the Second Circuit's tests have not 
been repudiated by the Reform Act. Section II.B then turns to sub­
sequent legislative history for additional evidence that the Second 
Circuit's tests retain some viability. Finally, section II.C concludes 
that complete rejection of the Second Circuit's tests would undercut 
the policy goals of the Reform Act. 
A. The Plain Language of the Statute Read with the 
Contemporaneous Legislative History Demonstrates the 
Survival of the Second Circuit's Tests 
Since the Reform Act fails to present any interpretation of the 
strong inference standard that might replace the Second Circuit's 
tests,51 the most natural inference is that it at least permits the use 
of the Second Circuit's tests.52 There is a significant contrary indi­
cation in the legislative history, however, because the Statement of 
Managers explains that "[b ]ecause the Conference Committee 
intends to strengthen existing pleading requirements, it does not 
intend to codify the Second Circuit's case law interpreting this 
pleading standard."53 After that sentence, the Managers appended 
footnote 23, which stated that mention of motive and opportunity 
and recklessness had been omitted.54 Courts that follow the Silicon 
Graphics rule often rely on footnote 23.55 These courts are 
incorrect. 
Footnote 23 should not be read as repudiating the Second 
Circuit's tests because Congress did not intend the Reform Act to 
change the substantive law of scienter but rather intended it to 
change the procedure through which plaintiffs plead scienter.56 
Second Circuit, see Silicon Graphics, 1996 WL 664639, at *6-7; Message to the House of 
Representatives Returning Without Approval the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
of 1995, 31 WEEKLY CoMP. PRES. Doc. 2210, 2210 (Dec. 19, 1995) [hereinafter Clinton Veto 
Message]. 
51. See Zeid v. Kimberley, 973 F. Supp. 910, 917 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (inferring support for 
the Second Circuit's tests from the absence of any alternative articulated in the Reform Act). 
52. See Rehm v. Eagle Fm. Corp., 954 F. Supp. 1246, 1252 (N.D. Ill. 1997) ("That 
Congress chose to incorporate verbatim the language of the Second Circuit Rule 9(b) stan­
dard is a strong indication of its intent to enact in §  78u-4(b)(2) a pleading standard of ap­
proximately the same specificity."). 
53. Statement of Managers, supra note 4, at 41. 
54. See id. at 48 n.23. 
55. See, e.g., In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., Nos. 97-16204 & 97-16240, 1999 WL 
446521, at *5 (9th Cir. July 2, 1999) (citing footnote 23 and accompanying text for the propo­
sition that "the joint committee expressly rejected the Second Circuit's two prong test"). 
56. This Note uses the label "substantive" to refer to the plaintiff's burdens at trial, and 
uses the term "procedural" to refer to the plaintiff's burdens of pleading. Tue distinction is 
highly relevant, see Cox ET AL., supra note 4, at 698 (distinguishing "whether scienter has 
been shown" from the "very different question" of "whether plaintiffs' complaint adequately 
2278 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 97:2265 
Section 21D(b )(2) specifies that a pleading must give rise to a 
strong inference of "the required state of mind" - a phrase that 
necessarily incorporates the scienter requirements of the underlying 
substantive law.57 This means that Congress sought only to change 
the pleading standard, not the underlying substantive law, with 
§ 21D(b )(2). 
Because every circuit court to consider the question has held 
that recklessness suffices substantively (to prove liability)S8 it would 
be anomalous to read footnote 23 as prohibiting plaintiffs from 
pleading recklessness, thereby imposing a higher burden on plain­
tiffs at the pleading stage (before discovery) than they would bear 
at trial (after discovery).59 One might argue that Congress intended 
to change the substantive securities law "through the back door" 
and merely chose to pursue that goal through procedural reform in 
order to avoid the political difficulty of appearing to be "pro­
securities fraud."60 As Chairman Levitt has suggested, however, it 
pleads scienter"), because the Reform Act changed only the pleading requirement, not the 
substantive law defining various securities fraud offenses. 
For discussion of this distinction in subsequent legislative history, see S. REP. No. 105-182, 
at 5-6 (1998) (clarifying that Congress did not intend the Reform Act to change the substan­
tive scienter requirement); 144 CoNG. REc. S4,798-99 (daily ed. May 13, 1998) (statement of 
Sen. Dodd) (affirming that he did not intend the Reform Act to alter the substantive scienter 
requirement). Cf. Zuckerman v. Foxmeyer Health Corp., 4 F. Supp. 2d 618, 622 & n.2 (N.D. 
Tex. 1998) (noting that the Reform Act "by its own terms, does nothing to alter the level of 
intent previously required" and "clearly does not attempt to supply a specific level of intent, 
but refers the reader to whichever cause of action in the Securities and Exchange Act a 
plaintiff brings suit"). 
57. See In re Baesa Sec. Litig., 969 F. Supp. 238, 240 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (stating that the 
definition of "required state of mind" must necessarily come from the Exchange Act or the 
underlying common law); see also Brief of the SEC, Amicus Curiae at 18, In re Silicon 
Graphics Sec. Litig., {9th Cir. 1997) (No. 97-16240) [hereinafter SEC Brief]. 
58. The Supreme Court reserved opinion on whether recklessness sufficed substantively 
in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 n.12 (1976). Every circuit court of appeals 
to consider the question, however, has found recklessness sufficient under Rule lOb-5. See 
Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1568-69 & n.6 (9th Cir. 1990) (en bane) 
(collecting cases). Even the Fourth Circuit essentially accepts recklessness. It has twice held, 
albeit both times in unpublished opinions, that severe recklessness suffices to satisfy the sci· 
enter requirement imposed in Ernst & Ernst. See SEC v. Gotchey, 981 F.2d 1251, 1992 WL 
385284 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding that "severe recklessness satisfies scienter requirement" ( cita­
tion omitted)); Kessler v. Falbo (In re Hughes Creek, Inc.), 980 F.2d 727, 1992 WL 301956 
{4th Cir. 1992) (same). 
59. See SEC Brief, supra note 57, at 19; David M. Lavine & Adam C. Pritchard, The 
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998: The Sun Sets on California's Blue Sky 
Laws, 54 Bus. LAW. 1, 35 (1998) ("It would hardly make sense to find recklessness insuffi­
cient at the pleading stage, but sufficient to impose liability."); see also SEC REPORT, supra 
note 3, at 41 (noting that an interpretation of § 21D{b)(2) that prohibited pleadings of reck­
lessness would also eliminate recklessness as a basis of liability). 
60. This argument would note that "[t]he Reform Act revised both the substantive stan­
dards and procedural rules governing private actions." Implementation of the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. and Hazard· 
ous Materials of the House Comm. on Commerce, 105th Cong. 18 (1997) [hereinafter 1997 
Act Hearing] (statement of Arthur Levitt, SEC Chairman). Chairman Levitt has described 
cases raising the pleading standard as "indirectly [affecting] the substantive liability require-
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is unlikely that this was Congress's intent,61 and courts should not 
assume duplicity on the part of the legislature in the face of a clear, 
textual command and even clearer legislative history. Moreover, 
the safe harbor provision, which protects certain classes of reckless 
statements, would be superfluous if recklessness were not within 
the scope of the Reform Act. Footnote 23 lists motive and opportu­
nity and recklessness all in the same sentence: "For this reason, the 
Conference Report chose not to include in the pleading standard 
certain language relating to motive, opportunity, or recklessness."62 
That sentence cannot mean one thing for the first two elements in 
the clause ("motive, opportunity") and something entirely different 
for the third element ("recklessness"). Footnote 23 is an 
all-or-nothing affair: if it does not prohibit the recklessness test, it 
cannot prohibit the motive and opportunity test either. 
A comparison between the scienter pleading provision of the 
Reform Act and the safe harbor provision further proves that 
Congress did not intend footnote 23 to imply an "actual knowl­
edge" standard. In the safe harbor provision, Congress expressly 
requires a showing of "actual knowledge . . .  that the statement was 
false or misleading."63 The stark absence of any similar language in 
§ 21D(b)(2) strongly implies that Congress did not intend 
§ 21D(b )(2) to require "actual knowledge."64 The contrast with the 
safe-harbor provision also goes to show that the Reform Act could 
not have been meant to compel strict adherence to the Second 
Circuit's tests.Gs 
ments of the securities laws themselves." 1997 Act Hearing, supra, at 23 (statement of Arthur 
Levitt). If one were prone to believe that the Silicon Graphics line of cases is correct, one 
could believe that Congress intended to change indirectly the substantive liability require­
ments - in other words, to change the substantive securities law through the back door. 
One might defend that argument by suggesting that the political difficulties associated with 
overtly sanctioning securities fraud might compel Congress to approach the substantive law 
through the vehicle of procedure. 
61. 1997 Act Hearing, supra note 60, at 23 (statement of Arthur Levitt). 
62. Statement of Managers, supra note 4, at 48 n.23. 
63. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 § 27A(c)(l)(B), 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78u-5(c)(l)(B) (Supp. III 1997). Tue safe harbor provision provides, inter alia, that certain 
classes of forward-looking statements are generally not subject to liability if they prove to be 
false or misleading. Liability for such statements will only be imposed upon a showing that 
the statement "was made with actual knowledge by [the person making the statement] that 
the statement was false or misleading." 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(l)(B). 
64. See In re Health Management, Inc. Sec. Litig., 970 F. Supp. 192, 201 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) 
("Congress knew well how to state [a 'knowing misbehavior'] standard . . . .  Tue Court finds 
the omission of such language in the statute significant . . . .  " ) (citation omitted). 
65. See In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., Nos. 97-16204 & 97-16240, 1999 WL 446521 
at *20 (9th Cir. July 2, 1999) (Browning, J., concurring and dissenting) ("Moreover, the Spec­
ter Amendment's codification of a specific test for pleading scienter would have been incon­
sistent with the provisions of the Reform Act requiring a different state of mind for different 
statements. Under the Reform Act's 'save harbor' provisions, plaintiffs must prove that 'for­
ward-looking' statements were made with 'actual knowledge' that they were false or mislead­
ing. • . . A recklessness standard for pleading that would apply to all statements, such as that 
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Footnote 23 should instead be understood as a reference to the 
Specter amendment.66 The Ninth Circuit's conclusion to the con­
tary notwithstanding,67 the conclusion that Congress deliberately 
declined to codify Senator Specter's articulation of the tests does 
not entail the conclusion that they affirmatively rejected all use of 
the Second Circuit case law.68 In fact, as Senator Dodd explained, 
one rationale for rejecting the Specter amendment was that it failed 
to capture the full detail and sophistication of the contemporary 
Second Circuit case law.69 Numerous statements in the legislative 
history to the effect that courts may find the Second Circuit's case 
law instructive70 indicate that removal of the Specter amendment 
did not constitute a conclusive rejection of the Second Circuit's 
tests. 
proposed in the Specter Amendment, would have been inconsistent with the safe harbor's 
requirement of 'actual knowledge' for forward-looking statements." (citation omitted)). 
66. See Clinton Veto Message, supra note 50, at 2210; SEC REPORT, supra note 3, at 29 
{identifying footnote 23 as an explanation of the deletion of the Specter amendment). 
67. In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., Nos. 97-16204 & 97-16240, 1999 WL 446521, at 
*4 {9th Cir. July 2, 1999) (citing as evidence of a raised standard, the fact that "Congress 
declined to enact an amendment that would have adopted the Second Circuit rule"). 
68. See, e.g., Silicon Graphics 1999 WL 446521, at *20 {Browning, J., concurring and dis­
senting) {"The legislative history suggests, however, that the Committee rejected language 
added by the Specter Amendment because it was 'an incomplete and inaccurate codification' 
of Second Circuit case law, not because the Committee intended to restrict the ways in which 
a 'strong inference' of scienter might be shown. Indeed, supporters of the defeated Specter 
Amendment were assured that while the Reform Act did not expressly provide that plaintiffs 
could plead scienter based on recklessness or motive and opportunity to defraud, 'the gui­
dance [provided by Second Circuit case law] is still going to be there."' (citation omitted)); 
OnBank & Trust Co. v. FDIC, 967 F. Supp. 81, 89 n.4 {W.D.N.Y. 1997) {"Simply because 
Congress did not codify that case law by making those factors an express part of the pleading 
standard does not mean that Congress intended to overturn that case law."). It is noteworthy 
that the Specter amendment would have codified the "strong circumstantial evidence of con­
scious misbehavior" standard alongside the recklessness and motive and opportunity stan­
dards. See 141 CoNG. REc. S9,170 (daily ed. June 27, 1995) {Amendment No. 1485). Yet the 
same courts that see the Specter amendment as decisive on the question of whether reckless­
ness or motive and opportunity survived do not hold that "circumstantial evidence of con­
scious misbehavior" was prohibited as well. See SEC REPORT, supra note 3, at 40 {"This 
conclusion was reached [by Judge Smith in Silicon Graphics] despite the fact that in deleting 
the clarifying amendment, the Conference Committee deleted not only the language regard­
ing motive, opportunity, and recklessness, but also the language regarding conscious 
misbehavior."). 
69. 141 CoNG. REc. S17,960 {daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dodd) (stating 
that "the amendment of the Senator from Pennsylvania completely omits a critical qualifica­
tion in the case law [namely that] 'where motive is not apparent, a plaintiff may plead scien­
ter by identifying circumstances' indicating wrongful behavior, but 'the strength of the 
circumstantial allegations must be correspondingly greater"'). 
In later debates, Senator Dodd made clear that the removal of the Specter amendment 
ought not be interpreted as prohibition of the Second Circuit's tests. See 141 CONG. REc. 
S19,071 (1995) (statement of Sen. Dodd) (explaining that even after the removal of the 
Specter amendment, the guidance provided by Second Circuit case law will still be available 
to courts). 
70. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 104-98, at 15 {1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 694. 
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President Clinton's veto message, which asserted that the 
Reform Act set the standard so far above the Second Circuit level 
as to bar too many meritorious claims,71 does not compel a contrary 
result, because the post-veto debates override the veto message.72 
President Clinton vetoed the Reform Act because he interpreted 
footnote 23 and the accompanying text, along with the removal of 
the Specter amendment, as evidence of a pleading standard higher 
than the Second Circuit's.73 The Supreme Court, however, has ex­
pressed significant skepticism about reliance on the comments of a 
bill's opponents as legislative history, on the grounds that such op­
ponents tend to "overstate [the bill's] reach."74 The Court has 
therefore held that it is not the "fears and doubts of the opposition" 
to which one looks when interpreting a statute, but rather the spon­
sors,75 who in this case said that President Clinton overestimated 
the import of footnote 23.76 For example, in the veto override de­
bate, Senator Domenici inserted a bill summary stating that the ob­
jective of section 21D(b ) (2) was "[t]o codify the requirements in the 
[Second] Circuit."77 Other comments by nonsponsor supporters 
make the same point.78 President Clinton himself appears to have 
recently recanted the main points in the veto message, suggesting 
that even he now concurs that the original veto message misstated 
the reach of the Reform Act.79 
71. Clinton Veto Message, supra note 50, at 2210. 
72. See NLRB v. Robbins Trre & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 235 (1978). But see Landgraf 
v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 255-56 (1994) (relying on veto as guide to legislative intent 
when Congress failed to override veto of bill with retroactivity provision, but succeeded in 
passing and obtaining signature of identical bill without retroactivity provision). 
73. See Clinton Veto Message, supra note 50, at 2210 ("[T]he conferees make crystal clear 
in the Statement of Managers their intent to raise the standard even beyond [the Second 
Circuit's]. I am not prepared to accept that."). 
74. NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 66 (1964); accord Shell 
Oil Co. v. Iowa Dept. of Revenue, 488 U.S. 19, 29 (1988); Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Co., 
453 U.S. 473, 483 (1981) (citing Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 
394 (1951)). 
75. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, 377 U.S. at 66 (quoting Schwegmann Bros., 341 U.S. at 
394). 
76. See 141 CoNG. REc. S19,150 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 1995) (statement of Sen. Domenici) 
("The President objected to the pleading standard. Yet it is the Second Circuit's pleading 
standard."). 
77. 141 CoNG. REc. Sl9,151 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 1995). 
78. See, e.g., 141 CoNG. REc. H15,219 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995) (statement of Rep. 
Lofgren) ("The President says he supports the [S]econd [C]ircuit standard for pleading. So 
do I. That is what is included in this bill."). 
79. See Statement on Signing the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, 34 
WEEKLY CoMP. PRES. Doc. 2247, 2248 (Nov. 3, 1998) ("In signing the Uniform Standards 
Act, I do so with the understanding . . .  that investors with legitimate complaints meeting the 
Second Circuit pleading standard will have access to our Nation's courts . . . .  the Statement of 
Managers confirms that the Second Circuit pleading standard will be the uniform standard 
for pleading securities fraud."). 
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B. Subsequent Legislative History Confirms the Survival of the 
Second Circuit's Tests 
In the legislative history for the Securities Litigation Uniform 
Standards Act of 1998, Congress clarified the intended meaning of 
the Reform Act.80 This subsequent legislative history, while not 
controlling, is entitled to some persuasive weight. In response to 
the Silicon Graphics line of cases, the Uniform Standards Act 
Conference Report directly states that Congress did not intend to 
remove recklessness as a basis of liability under Rule lOb-5. The 
necessary implication is that the Reform Act was not intended to 
prohibit pleading recklessness. 
Subsequent legislative history deserves weight in the interpre­
tive process, even though it lacks both the force of law and of con­
temporaneous legislative history.81 Subsequent legislative history is 
at its most relevant when courts have based decisions on legislative 
history and Congress has then reviewed the same materials and 
drawn an opposite conclusion. 82 
Precisely such a review and clarification has occurred with re­
spect to the Reform Act: the Securities Litigation Uniform 
Standards Act of 1998 arose out of legislative hearings on the ef­
fects of the Reform Act. Congress heard testimony that a primary 
result of the Reform Act was to drive lawsuits from federal court 
into state court, to evade the strict federal pleading standard. The 
80. Note that the "uniformity" referred to in the title of the Act is uniformity across the 
federal-state line. The purpose of the Uniform Standards Act is to preempt certain state 
securities fraud class action lawsuits, thereby preventing plaintiffs from circumventing the 
Reform Act by shifting to state courts. See id. at 2248. The Uniform Standards Act does not 
purport to legislate away the nonuniformity across the federal circuits. 
81. The Advanta court declined to give the subsequent legislative history any weight at 
all. See In re Advanta Sec. Litig., No. 998-1846, 1999 WL 395997, at *6 (3d Cir. June 17, 
1999) ("[O]ur interpretation of the Reform Act is unaffected by the legislative history of the 
Standards Act."). While the Advanta court correctly cited Central Bank of Denver v. First 
Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 185 (1994) for the point that the "interpretation 
given by one Congress (or a committee or Member thereof) to an earlier statute is of little 
assistance in discerning the meaning of that statute," courts should nevertheless not dismiss 
subsequent legislative history entirely. See, e.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 
677, 687 n.7 (1979) (acknowledging rule that subsequent legislative history does not control, 
but stating that courts are remiss to ignore it completely); see also North Haven Bd. of Educ. 
v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 535 (1982) (approving Cannon). 
82. See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 541 (1962) (Harlan, J.) (plurality opinion) 
(endorsing the use of subsequent legislative history in construing legislation "[e]specially . .  , 
when the Congress has been stimulated by decisions of this Court to investigate the historical 
materials involved and has drawn from them a contrary conclusion"). The Glidden Court 
equates subsequent legislative history with subsequent interpretive legislation: "'I)'pical is a 
statement in the 1958 House Report . . . .  Subsequent legislation which declares the intent of 
an earlier law . . . . is entitled to weight when it comes to the problem of construction." 370 
U.S. at 541 (internal question marks and citations omitted). To the extent that such an equiv­
ocation is plausible, other Supreme Court precedents approve the use of subsequent legisla· 
tion as an interpretive aid. See, e.g., NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 275 (1974); 
Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 380-81 (1969); FHA v. Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 
84, 90 (1958). 
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Senate therefore initiated the Uniform Standards Act to raise the 
bar in state court.83 During the debate over the Uniform Standards 
Act, the SEC expressed concern that it might lock in erroneous dis­
trict court holdings that rejected recklessness as a basis for pleading 
scienter.84 The Conference Committee addressed this concern by 
stating that "the clear intent in 1995 and our continuing intent in 
this legislation is that neither the Reform Act nor S. 1260 in any 
way alters the scienter standard in Federal securities fraud suits."85 
This passage attempts to remove any ambiguity surrounding the 
purpose of the Reform Act: Congress did not intend the Reform 
Act to change the underlying liability rules. The clear implication is 
that the pleading standard should not be interpreted so as to elimi­
nate recklessness as a method of pleading securities fraud. If reck­
lessness was not eliminated, neither was the motive and opportunity 
test,86 and the Second Circuit's interpretation of the pleading stan­
dard remains viable even under the Reform Act. 
83. See S. REP. No. 105-182, at 3 (1998). 
84. See Letter from Arthur Levitt, Chairman of the SEC and Commissioners Isaac C. 
Hunt, Jr. and Laura S. Unger to Senators Alfonse M. D'Amato, Phil Gra=, and 
Christopher Dodd (Mar. 24, 1998) ("[W]hen the Commission testified ... we stated that a 
uniform standard for securities fraud class actions that did not permit investors to recover 
losses attributable to reckless misconduct would jeopardize the integrity of the securities 
markets. In light of this profound concern, we were gratified by the language in your letter of 
today agreeing to restate in S. 1260's legislative history, and in the expected debate on the 
Senate floor, that the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 did not, and was not 
intended to, alter the well-recognized and critically important scienter standard."); 1997 Act 
Hearing, supra note 60 (testimony of Arthur Levitt, SEC Chairman) ("The Commission was 
able to support S. 1260 only upon receiving assurances that legislative history would be in­
serted into the record making clear that the Reform Act was not meant to define or alter the 
state of mind requirements for securities fraud liability."). 
85. S. REP. No. 105-182 at 3-4 (1998) (Statement of Managers - The Securities 
Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998). Similar language is found in the Senate Report. 
See S. REP. No. 105-182, at 6 (1998) ("It was the intent of Congress, as was expressly stated 
during the legislative debate on the PSLRA, and particularly during the debate on overriding 
the President's veto, that the PSLRA establish a uniform federal standard on pleading re­
quirements by adopting the pleading standard applied by the Second Circuit Court of Ap­
peals."). A colloquy on the Senate floor between Senators Dodd and D'Amato (both 
sponsors of the Reform Act) made the same point, and explained that footnote 23 should not 
be interpreted to the contrary. See 144 CONG. REc. S4,798-99 (daily ed. May 13, 1998) (collo­
quy between Sen. Dodd and Sen. D'Amato) (reiterating that neither sponsor intended the 
Reform Act to raise the bar above the Second Circuit level and confirming that footnote 23 
was intended merely to account for the omission of the Specter amendment). On the House 
side, Representatives Eshoo and Cox (both sponsors of the Reform Act) engaged in a paral­
lel colloquy, which concluded with Representative Cox's statement that "[i]t is my clear un­
derstanding that Congress did not, in adopting the Reform Act, intend to alter standards of 
liability under the Exchange Act." 144 CONG. REc. H6,061 (daily ed. July 21, 1998) (colloquy 
between Rep. Eshoo and Rep. Cox). 
86. See supra note 59. 
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C. The Policy Rationales Underlying the Reform Act Require 
Retention of the Second Circuit's Tests 
Protection of investors and investor confidence is "the overrid­
ing purpose of our Nation's securities laws," and the purpose of the 
Reform Act. s7 Investors (and by extension, investor confidence) 
are protected by the deterrent value of private enforcement of the 
securities laws. If the scienter pleading standard were raised to cir­
cumstantial evidence of conscious wrongdoing, that deterrent value 
would diminish: 
Ensuring that the scienter standard includes reckless misconduct is 
critical to investor protection. Creating a higher scienter standard 
would lessen the incentives for issuers of securities to conduct a full 
inquiry into potentially troublesome areas and could therefore dam­
age the disclosure process that has made our markets a model for 
other nations. The U.S. securities markets are the envy of the world 
precisely because investors at home and abroad have enormous confi­
dence in the way our markets operate. Altering the scienter standard 
in the way envisioned by some of these district court decisions could 
be very damaging to that confidence.ss 
While the Reform Act focuses on decreasing securities lawsuits, 
that is only because Congress believed that the pendulum had 
swung too far toward securities fraud plaintiffs.s9 An interpretation 
of the Reform Act that raised the bar too high would be inconsis­
tent with the balance that Congress intended the Reform Act to 
strike. Complete prohibition of motive and opportunity pleadings 
would be inconsistent in precisely this fashion, because it would al­
most certainly preclude some legitimate complaints.90 Permitting 
recklessness and motive and opportunity to play some role in secur­
ities fraud litigation helps protect investors and maintain confidence 
by exposing fraudulent schemes that might withstand scrutiny 
under a more defense-oriented test. 
* * * 
Therefore, just as the Reform Act does not codify the Second 
Circuit's tests, it also does not prohibit their use. Put differently, 
the Reform Act rejects both per se approaches, Marksman and 
Silicon Graphics. Under the Reform Act, recklessness is neither 
per se sufficient nor per se insufficient (lest the rule thwart the con­
sensus of every Circuit Court of Appeals that recklessness generally 
87. Statement of Managers, supra note 4, at 31. 
88. 144 CoNG. REc. S4,798 (daily ed. May 13, 1998) (statement of Sen. Dodd). 
89. Statement of Managers, supra note 4, at 31 (" Congress has been prompted by signifi­
cant evidence of abuse in private securities lawsuits to enact reforms to protect investors and 
maintain confidence in our capital markets."). 
90. See Clinton Veto Message, supra note 50, at 2210. 
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suffices to establish liability under Rufo lOb-5).91 Subsequent legis­
lative history has made clear that Congress did not intend to change 
the substantive law of scienter: in other words, they did not intend 
to overturn the consensus of the circuits. The treatment of motive 
and opportunity tracks the treatment of recklessness - pleading 
motive and opportunity is neither per se sufficient nor per se insuffi­
cient. The need to maintain confidence in the securities market 
also supports the availability of the Second Circuit's tests. 
III. CONGRESS LEFT COURTS TO DECIDE ON A CASE-BY-CASE 
BASIS WHETHER p ARTICULAR SHOWINGS OF MOTIVE AND 
OPPORTUNITY OR CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF RECKLESSNESS 
GIVE RISE TO A STRONG INFERENCE OF SCIENTER 
A small cadre of federal district courts has consistently held that 
the Reform Act codified the Second Circuit's pleading standard, a 
result that is logical given the plain text of section 21D(b )(2), but 
not the Second Circuit's tests interpreting that standard.92 This Part 
argues that these courts, led by In re Baesa Securities Litigation, are 
correct. The Reform Act essentially shifts the locus of uncertainty 
in federal securities fraud lawsuits. In the pre-Reform Act Second 
Circuit, and in post-Reform Act Marksman courts, the courts com­
pare a plaintiff's pleading with an ideal motive and opportunity 
pleading or an ideal recklessness pleading. The question becomes 
"is this allegation of motive and opportunity or recklessness suffi­
ciently specific and particular to give the test any teeth?" The 
Reform Act shifts the locus of uncertainty from the test itself to the 
antecedent and ultimately terminal question "has the plaintiff 
raised a strong inference of scienter?" Section III.A contends that 
the plain language of the statute and the legislative history dictate 
this interpretation. Section III.B demonstrates that the Baesa rule 
also best effectuates the policy goals of the Reform Act. 
91. If recklessness is sufficient to establish liability, recklessness must also be a sufficient 
pleading. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. Tue alternative, requiring a higher stan­
dard for pleading than for a showing of liability, requires one to believe that Congress in­
tended covertly to change the liability standard, a conclusion that courts should not accept. 
See text accompanying supra notes 60-61. 
92. See Malin v. IVAX Corp., 17 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1357 (S.D. Fla. 1998); Queen Uno Ltd. 
Partnership v. Coeur D'Alene Mines Corp., 2 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1359 (D. Colo. 1998); In re 
Stratosphere Corp. Sec. Litig., 1 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1107-08 (D. Nev. 1998); In re Health Man­
agement, Inc. Sec. Litig., 970 F. Supp. 192, 200-01 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); In re Baesa Sec. Litig., 
969 F. Supp. 238, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
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A. The Baesa Rule Flows Directly from the Plain Language of 
the Reform Act, and Is Supported by the 
Legislative History 
The Baesa rule is relatively simple: courts must conduct a fresh 
examination of each plaintiff's allegations, without regard to "for­
malistic categor[ies]" such as recklessness or motive and opportu­
nity, to determine whether a strong inference of scienter is raised.93 
The Baesa court observed that section 21D(b )(2) merely adopts the 
strong inference standard but stops short of endorsing any particu­
lar method of raising a strong inference.94 The court then explained 
that: 
The conclusion follows from the plain language of the statute that the 
mere pleading of motive and opportunity does not, of itself, automati­
cally suffice to raise a strong inference of scienter. 
This, of course, does not mean that particulars regarding motive 
and opportunity may not be relevant to pleading circumstances from 
which a strong inference of fraudulent scienter may be inferred. In 
some cases, they may even be sufficient by themselves to do so. But, 
under the Reform Act, and in contrast to prior Second Circuit prece­
dent, they are not presumed sufficient to do so. Rather, under the 
Reform Act formulation, the pleadings must set forth sufficient par­
ticulars, of whatever kind, to raise a strong inference of the required 
scienter.95 
The key to the Baesa rule is its refusal to determine the outcome of 
a motion to dismiss based on "formalistic categor[ies] such as mo­
tive and opportunity."96 Under the Baesa rule, recklessness or mo­
tive and opportunity are presumed neither sufficient nor 
insufficient. Further, those categories do not exhaust a plaintiff's 
potential options: just as a plaintiff might make a recklessness 
showing or a motive and opportunity showing that was sufficient to 
raise a strong inference of scienter, a plaintiff could also "impress[ ] 
upon the court a novel legal theory."97 The sole inquiry under this 
approach is the strong inference standard, and the court declines to 
take shortcuts by presuming either recklessness or motive and op­
portunity to be per se sufficient or per se necessary.98 
The Baesa rule follows from the language of the Reform Act. 
Congress codified the Second Circuit's pleading standard, but ex­
pressly refrained from codifying the Second Circuit's tests interpret­
ing the standard. The inevitable conclusion is that courts must 
93. Queen Uno, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 1359. 
94. See In re Baesa, 969 F. Supp. at 242. 
95. 969 F. Supp. at 242 (footnotes omitted). 
96. Queen Uno, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 1359. 
97. In re Health Management, 970 F. Supp. at 201. 
98. See Queen Uno, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 1359; see also Malin v. IVAX Corp., 17 F. Supp. 2d 
1345, 1356-57 (S.D. Fla. 1998). 
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examine a plaintiff's showings to determine if they meet the strong 
inference standard.99 The Reform Act, "while adopting the 'strong 
inference' requirement, makes no mention whatever of 'motive and 
opportunity,' nor singles out any other special kind of particulars as 
presumptively sufficient. "100 The Reform Act also does not single 
out any "special kind of particulars" as presumptively insufficient. 
Thus, the Baesa rule merely asks courts to "appl[y] the statute as 
written,'' under which "allegations of motive, opportunity, or reck­
less behavior may still be relevant."101 
The Baesa rule is consistent with the key elements from the leg­
islative history that the Silicon Graphics court relied on. These ele­
ments all demonstrate that the Second Circuit's tests were 
deliberately omitted from the legislation.102 The Baesa rule is con­
sistent with this point, because it does not give either recklessness 
or motive and opportunity presumptive weight. The Silicon 
Graphics rule also relies on citations to the legislative history tend­
ing to demonstrate that Congress intended to raise the overall bar 
for pleading scienter nationally, which would require raising the bar 
in the Second Circuit.103 The Baesa rule is consistent with this point 
as well: under the Baesa rule, courts in the Second Circuit may no 
longer permit a pleading to survive as a matter of law merely 
because it contains allegations of recklessness or motive and oppor­
tunity. Instead, they must find that those allegations are sufficient 
to raise a strong inference of scienter on those facts. This raises the 
99. In re Advanta Sec. Litig., No. 98-1846, 1999 WL 395997, at *7 (3d Cir. June 17, 1999) 
("[I]f Congress had desired to eliminate motive and opportunity or recklessness as a basis for 
scienter, it could have done so expressly in the text of the Reform Act. In our view, the fact 
that Congress considered inserting language directly addressing this line of cases, but ulti­
mately chose not to, suggests that it intended to leave the matter to judicial interpretation."); 
In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig. Nos. 97-16204 & 97-16240, 1999 WL 446521, at *20 (9th 
Cir. July 2, 1999) (Browning, J., concurring and dissenting) (citing Advanta for the same 
point). 
100. In re Baesa, 969 F. Supp. 238, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
101. OnBank & Trust Co. v. FDIC, 967 F. Supp. 81, 89 n.4 (W.D.N.Y. 1997); accord 
Myles v. Midcom Co=unications, Inc., No. C96-614D (W.D. Wash. Nov. 19, 1996) ("The 
statute itself defines the standard and the statute is clear."), discussed in SEC REPORT, supra 
note 3, at 44. 
102. See, e.g., In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 970 F. Supp. 746, 756 (N.D. Cal. 
1997) (citing the Statement of Managers for the proposition that the Conference Committee 
deliberately chose not to include references to recklessness or motive and opportunity in the 
pleading standard). 
103. See, e.g., Silicon Graphics 1996 WL 664639, at *6 n.4 ("The Court finds that the 
legislative history, the most definitive part of which is the Conference Committee Report, 
establishes the SRA standard as stricter than the Second Circuit standard."). 
Judge Smith drafted two opinions in Silicon Graphics. The first, 1996 WL 664639, at *1, 
was the original hearing. The second, 970 F. Supp. at 746, responded to a renewed motion to 
dismiss and a motion for su=ary judgment following plaintiffs' submission of an amended 
complaint. For purposes of this Note, the two are functionally interchangeable, because 
Judge Smith incorporated her prior holding as to the pleading standard in her second opin­
ion. See Silicon Graphics, 970 F. Supp. at 754 ("After reviewing the arguments and the legal 
authorities, the Court believes that its original interpretation was correct."). 
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bar even in the Second Circuit,104 without demanding a showing of 
conscious wrongdoing - the hurdle President Clinton rejected as 
excessively prodefendant. 
B. The Baesa Rule Is Consistent with the Policies Underlying the 
Reform Act 
The Baesa rule effectuates the Reform Act's policy goals better 
than either the Marksman rule or the Silicon Graphics rule. Section 
III.B.1 argues that the case-by-case element of the Baesa rule pre­
vents the kind of generic, "cookie-cutter" pleadings Congress 
sought to avoid. Section III.B.2 concludes that the Baesa rule 
avoids the Marksman problem of risking nonmeritorious litigation, 
while also avoiding the Silicon Graphics problem of setting the bar 
too high. 
1. The Baesa Rule Prevents "Cookie-Cutter" Complaints 
The Baesa court's case-by-case approach prevents abusive 
cookie-cutter complaints. Boilerplate litigation filed without inves­
tigation into specific facts was one of Congress's central objections. 
The House Report used the phrase "cookie-cutter complaints" to 
refer to boilerplate claims filed within hours of a significant stock 
movement.105 The Report cited the example of Philip Morris: 
On April 2, 1993, Philip Morris announced that it would reduce the 
average price of its cigarettes, and therefore, that it expected earnings 
in the future to decline. Less than five hours later, the first of [ten] 
lawsuits [in two days] were filed . . . .  Two of the complaints con­
tained identical allegations "that the defendants . . .  engaged in con­
duct to create and prolong the illusion of Philip Morris' success in the 
toy industry." Apparently, these complaints are lodged in some com­
puter bank of fraud complaints, available for quick access but without 
much regard to accuracy.106 
The case-by-case approach of the Baesa rule would control this 
problem better than a per se rule. While judges will certainly scruti­
nize complaints carefully under any rule, a generic complaint is 
surely easier to draft under a per se rule that has endorsed one or 
another formalistic test. A rule that mandates case-by-case analysis 
should result in more detailed scrutiny of a plaintiff's allegations, 
104. See In re Stratosphere Corp. Sec. Litig., 1 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1107-08 (D. Nev. 1998). 
105. H.R. REP. No. 104-50, pt. 1, at 16 (1995) (commenting that plaintiff's lawyers would 
"file suit within hours or days" of a stock drop "citing a laundry list of cookie-cutter com­
plaints"); see also 141 CoNG. REc. Sl9,064 {daily ed. Dec 21, 1995) (statement of Sen. 
Faircloth) ("One law firm files a securities suit every 5 working days, one a week. They are 
just churning them out, whether there is any validity or not. That is how much it takes to 
meet the payroll, so they churn out one a week."). 
106. H.R. REP. No. 104-50, pt. 1, at 16 (1995) (second omission in original) (emphasis in 
original) (footnote omitted). 
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compelling the plaintiff to put more detail and care into complaints, 
with an attendant decrease in cookie-cutter complaints.107 
Many Members of Congress regarded these boilerplate com­
plaints as paradigm cases of abuse of the litigation process.108 
Plaintiffs' lawyers designed the cookie-cutter complaint to track 
language from the case law - the so-called magic words, in order 
to survive a motion to dismiss with minimal actual evidence of 
wrongdoing. Because 12(b)(6) motions must argue exclusively 
from the pleadings, such complaints often permitted plaintiffs to get 
to discovery. Once the plaintiffs got to discovery, they were able to 
extract the coercive results Congress sought to avoid. By depriving 
litigants of the "magic words" and thereby reducing boilerplate 
complaints, the Baesa rule should check generic litigation before it 
can develop into coercive settlements. 
2. The Baesa Rule Properly Balances the Competing Goals of 
Minimizing Frivolous Litigation and Protecting Investors 
The Baesa rule properly reconciles the need for recklessness­
based liability in some cases with Congress's expressed intention to 
shelter forward-looking statements. A rule that treats recklessness 
as per se insufficient would undercut the Reform Act's goal of 
"protect[ing] investors and [maintaining] confidence in the securi­
ties markets."109 In an efficient market, misinformation directly 
107. Complaints filed immediately subsequent to the Reform Act provide some support 
for this claim. The SEC's Report to the President and the Congress found that, in the first 
year after the Reform Act, "[m]ost securities class action complaints filed in federal court . . .  
appear to contain detailed allegations specific to the action. Few appear to be cookie-cutter 
complaints and a substantial majority include allegations beyond a mere failed forecast." 
SEC REPORT, supra note 3, at 4; see also id. at 22 ("[M]ost complaints [filed post-Reform 
Act] do not have the type of glaring errors which would suggest that they were the product of 
a hurried word processing 'cut-and-paste."'). It is reasonable to suspect that the Reform 
Act's disruption of previously per se acceptable standards contributed to this increased 
specificity. 
108. See, e.g., 141 CoNG. REc. S8,897 (daily ed. June 22, 1995) (statement of Sen. 
Domenici) ("All the allegations are the same, case after case . . . .  [T]hey always use the same 
allegations and the same words. The lawyers just change the name of the company being 
sued - it pops out of the computer."); 141 CoNG. REc. S8,894 (daily ed. June 22, 1995) 
(statement of Sen. Dodd) ("No one lawyer could possibly have investigated the facts this 
quickly."); 141 CoNG. REc. S8,911 (daily ed. June 22, 1995) (statement of Sen. Faircloth) 
(describing cookie-cutter complaints as "not lawsuits" but "legalized blackmail"); 141 CONG. 
REc. S,8935 (daily ed. June 22, 1995) (statement of Sen. Grams) (complaining that cookie­
cutter complaints "are rarely filed with any evidence of fraud or wrongdoing - in fact, they 
are often filed simply with the knowledge that the value of a stock has dropped"). 
109. Statement of Managers, supra note 4, at 31; see also The Securities Litigation Uni­
form Standards Act of 1997 - S. 1260: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Sec. of the Sen. 
Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 105th Cong. 45 (1997) [hereinafter S. 1260 
Hearing] (statement of Arthur Levitt, Jr., SEC Chairman and Isaac C. Hunt, Jr., SEC Com­
missioner) ("The Commission strongly believes that recklessness must be preserved as the 
standard for liability because it is essential to investor protection. . . . [Failing to] include 
recklessness as a basis for liability would jeopardize the integrity of the securities markets, 
and would deal a crippling blow to defrauded investors with meritorious claims."). 
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and immediately distorts the market, regardless of the intentions of 
the disseminator of the misinformation.11° Therefore, reckless dis­
semination of misinformation undercuts the protection of investors 
and the maintenance of confidence in the securities markets every 
bit as much as conscious dissemination of misinformation. Civil lia­
bility for recklessness encourages corporate officials to verify proac­
tively the information they disseminate, while abolishing such 
liability would create a perverse incentive for corporate officials to 
"remain purposely ignorant."111 
Enforcing the motive and opportunity test as a per se sufficient 
showing would undercut the Reform Act's goal of preventing frivo­
lous and abusive litigation.112 Pleading motive and opportunity is 
often too easy - one merely names the corporate officers (who 
have opportunity by definition) and asserts a motive generally ap­
plicable to most or all corporate officials - for example, 
"[m]aintaining the prestige of a company and the value of its stock, 
preventing hostile takeovers, retaining executive positions or ob­
taining performance based bonuses, [or] increasing the value of an 
officer's stock options or stock sales."113 A per se rule accepting 
motive and opportunity pleadings would therefore invite exactly 
the sort of "fraud by hindsight" complaints Congress sought to 
prevent.114 
Eliminating any possibility of pleading motive and opportunity, 
however, sets the bar so high as to risk excluding plaintiffs with le­
gitimate complaints.115 The Baesa rule effectively splits the differ­
ence by giving courts license to take notice of motive and 
opportunity when the facts are such that motive and opportunity 
genuinely raise strong suspicion without compelling courts to accept 
specious motive and opportunity showings that fail to invoke genu­
ine suspicion. Eliminating the presumption that pleading motive 
110. See Cox ET AL., supra note 4, at 36-37 (reporting empirical research demonstrating 
that the U.S. securities market is efficient, i.e., that it rapidly incorporates information 
presented and adjusts prices accordingly). 
111. Malin v. IVAX Corp., 17 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1357 {S.D. Fla. 1998); see also S. 1260 
Hearing, supra note 109, at 45 (statement of Arthur Levitt, Jr., SEC Chairman and Isaac C. 
Hunt, Jr., SEC Commissioner) ("A higher scienter standard would lessen the incentives for 
corporations to conduct a full inquiry into potentially troublesome or embarrassing areas, 
and thus would threaten the disclosure process that has made our markets a model for na­
tions around the world."). 
112. See Statement of Managers, supra note 4, at 31-32. 
113. Malin, 17 F. Supp. 2d at 1358. 
114. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
115. See Clinton Veto Message, supra note 50, at 2210; see also Rehm v. Eagle Fm. Corp., 
954 F. Supp. 1246, 1252 (N.D. Ill. 1997) ("To impose a higher pleading standard would make 
it extremely difficult to sufficiently plead a lOb-5 claim - an outcome which would certainly 
be contrary to the broad remedial purposes of the federal securities laws."). 
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and opportunity is per se sufficient accomplishes Congress's goal of 
strengthening existing pleading requirements.116 
One potential problem with the Baesa rule is the fact that 
Congress hoped that the Reform Act would reduce forum shopping 
by creating a nationally uniform pleading standard. The legislative 
history reflects such a goal,117 as does the subsequent passage of the 
Uniform Standards Act.118 The SEC rejected the Baesa rule pre­
cisely because "such a test is likely to produce varying applications 
of the pleading standards, a result contrary to Congress's goal of 
uniformity. "119 
Substantial uniformity is generated, however, merely by the act 
of codifying the Second Circuit's pleading standard.120 While dif-
116. See Queen Uno Ltd. Partnership v. Coeur D'Alene Mines Corp., 2 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 
1359 (D. Colo. 1998); In re Stratosphere Corp. Sec. Litig., 1 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1107-08 (D. 
Nev. 1998). This argument is highly significant because it accounts for a key element in the 
legislative history that many courts have relied upon to strike down the "motive and opportu­
nity" test entirely. Tue Conference Report states that "[b]ecause the Conference Committee 
intends to strengthen existing pleading requirements, it does not intend to codify the Second 
Circuit's case law interpreting this pleading standard." Statement of Managers, supra note 4, 
at 41. Numerous courts have relied upon this language to strike down the "motive and op­
portunity" test. See, e.g., In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C 96-0393, 1996 WL 
664639, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 1996). Tue Stratosphere court's reasoning - that eliminat­
ing "the ability to rely solely on motive and opportunity" strengthens the Second Circuit's 
standard, 1 F. Supp. 2d at 1107-08, accounts for this language in a way that does not require 
courts to disregard the plain language of the statute, ignore significant threads in both the 
contemporaneous and subsequent legislative history, or dismiss the considered opinion of the 
administrative agency charged by Congress with interpreting the Reform Act. 
117. See Statement of Managers, supra note 4, at 41 ("Tue House and Senate hearings on 
securities litigation reform included testimony on the need to establish uniform . . .  pleading 
requirements . . . .  "). 
118. See S. REP. No. 105-182, at 4 (1998) ("A number of witnesses at the July 1997 hear­
ing advocated legislation to establish uniform standards for private securities class action 
litigation. This legislation is an outgrowth of the July 1997 hearings and subsequent investi­
gation and oversight by the Committee." (footnote omitted)). 
119. SEC Brief, supra note 57, at 25 n.51. While arguing for the Marksman rule, the SEC 
makes the predicate arguments upon which the Baesa approach is based in an alternative 
argument - "[w)hether or not [ adoption of the Second Circuit tests) is compelled as a 
matter of legislative intent, Congress certainly did not foreclose the possibility of the use of 
the Second Circuit tests in applying the Reform Act's pleading standard. Id. at 16. At a 
minimum, therefore, this Court has the discretion to adopt the Second Circuit's tests as its 
own under the Reform Act." Id. Tue fact that the Second Circuit's tests are neither man­
dated nor forbidden by the Reform Act is the underlying rationale for the Baesa approach. 
In its amicus brief at the district court level, the Commission more directly approved the 
Baesa reasoning: "Congress simply elected not to attempt to codify the guidance provided in 
Second Circuit case law, preferring to leave to the courts the discretion to create their own 
standards for determining whether a plaintiff has established the required strong inference." 
Brief of the SEC, Amicus Curiae, In re Silicon Graphics Sec. Litig., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 'll 99, 
325 (N.D. Cal. 1996) quoted in SEC REPORT, supra note 3, at 42. 
120. Professor Grundfest has stated that codification of the Second Circuit's pleading 
standard, even absent codification of the tests, achieves adequate uniformity. See Grundfest 
memorandum, supra note 40, at S19,068 ("As I read the securities litigation conference re­
port, the pleading standard is faithful to the Second Circuit's test. Indeed, I �oncur with the 
decision to eliminate the Specter amendment language, which was an incomplete and inaccu­
rate codification of case law in the circuit . . . .  [C)odification of a uniform pleading standard 
in lOb-5 cases would eliminate the current confusion among circuits. Tue Second Circuit 
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ferent courts will surely see different showings as sufficient or not 
sufficient under the Baesa standard, thus giving rise to some incen­
tive to forum-shop, the result would be no different under the 
Marksman rule, as empirically demonstrated by inconsistent rulings 
within the Second Circuit.121 If the Second Circuit can have signifi­
cant internal variance in its interpretation of the motive and oppor­
tunity test, it would be naYve to assume that there will not be even 
more variance as the other eleven circuits interpret and apply it. 
Further, the Silicon Graphics rule would also risk this same incen­
tive to forum shop, since it would replace the tested and interpreted 
Second Circuit's standards with an untested and uninterpreted "cir­
cumstantial evidence of conscious wrongdoing" standard. Faced 
with the specter of allowing probable fraud to go unpunished, one 
can easily imagine district court judges reaching widely varying con­
clusions as to precisely what constitutes circumstantial evidence of 
conscious wrongdoing. 
The Baesa rule is a direct application of the plain language of 
the statute. To reject it based on the uniformity issue is to ignore 
the language Congress actually codified in favor of a collage of 
snippets from the legislative history. Courts should generally de­
cline to do this,122 especially when the relative uniformity to be 
gained is so minimal. 
* * * 
The Baesa rule properly charts a course between two extreme 
alternatives. The Marksman approach, treating recklessness and 
motive and opportunity as codified, undoes too much of the 
Reform Act. It would permit coercive, cookie-cutter complaints 
and would allow generic litigation without actual evidence of 
wrongdoing. The Silicon Graphics approach, rejecting both reck­
lessness and motive and opportunity, takes the Reform Act too far. 
It would block complaints with genuine merit and would encourage 
corporate officials to remain purposefully ignorant of securities 
standard is among the most thoroughly tested, and it also balances deterrence of unjustified 
claims with the need to retain a strong private right of action . . . •  In short, I support the 
pleading provision of the conference report."). 
121. Compare In re Tune Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 270 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding 
that where defendant offered stock to raise capital for debt repayment purposes, plaintiff 
adequately alleged motive by alleging that defendant intended to artificially enhance the 
price of stock and thereby decrease dilutive effect of sale) with San Leandro Emergency 
Med. Group Profit Sharing Plan v. Philip Morris Cos., 75 F.3d 801, 813-14 {2d Cir. 1996) 
(holding that, where defendant issued $700 million in debt securities, plaintiff did not ade­
quately allege motive by alleging that defendant intended to maintain the company's bond or 
credit ratings to secure favorable debt terms). 
122. While it is always relevant, legislative history cannot override a clear statutory man­
date. See United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241, {1989) {holding that the 
clear meaning of the statute trumps contrary legislative history); Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 
886, 896 (1984) (same). The legislative history relied on by the Baesa rule is not excluded by 
these cases because it is consistent with a plain reading of the statute. 
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fraud. The Baesa rule finds an effective middle ground by denying 
litigants the ability to withstand 12(b)(6) motions merely by com­
plying with a set formula, but still permitting litigants to plead reck­
lessness or motive and opportunity when they have genuine reason 
to do so. 
CONCLUSION 
The plain language of the Reform Act simply requires that 
plaintiffs in federal securities fraud cases plead facts giving rise to a 
strong inference of scienter. Conspicuously absent, however, from 
the plain language of the Reform Act is any mention of tests such 
as motive and opportunity or circumstantial evidence of reckless­
ness. District courts under the Reform Act must therefore scruti­
nize the factual allegations in each securities fraud case to 
determine whether or not those allegations give rise to a strong in­
ference of scienter. In that regard, the Second Circuit's case law 
may, in Senator Dodd's words, be "instructive"123 - if particular 
Second Circuit opinions evaluate facts similar to those of a contem­
porary case, those opinions would be persuasive authority. To 
whatever extent a Second Circuit opinion gives compelling reasons 
for its conclusion that a particular motive and opportunity or reck­
lessness showing raised a strong inference of scienter, those reasons 
would continue to be persuasive and relevant in the contemporary 
case. 
The Baesa rule admits ambiguity, but only because it is balanc­
ing the conflicting demands of discouraging securities fraud and dis­
couraging frivolous lawsuits. As the case history in the Second 
Circuit amply demonstrates, phrases like "motive and opportunity" 
or "circumstantial evidence of conscious or reckless wrongdoing" 
are far from precise formulations that judges may apply to reach 
clear and unambiguous results. The Reform Act shifts the locus of 
uncertainty from questions such as "is this allegation of motive suf­
ficiently specific to give the test any teeth?" to the dispositive ques­
tion "has the plaintiff raised a strong inference of scienter?" Courts 
may be guided by Second Circuit case law ip. answering that ques­
tion, but they may not regard it as determinative. 
Judge Brimmer's explanation in Queen Uno precisely captures 
the point of the Reform Act: 
In short, the Reform Act requires that a court examine a plaintiff's 
allegations in their entirety, without regard to whether those allega­
tions fall within a formalistic category such as motive and opportu­
nity, to determine if the allegations permit a strong inference of 
fraudulent intent. If the facts alleged permit such an inference then a 
123. 141 CONG. REc. S17,960 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dodd). 
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lOb-5 claim will by the Reform Act's plain language survive a motion 
to dismiss.124 
Although formalistic categories are convenient, the Reform Act 
sacrifices that convenience for greater analytical rigor in each indi­
vidual case. The heuristic function of the Baesa rule is to remind 
litigants of the Reform Act's mandate for individualized pleadings, 
without crippling necessary private enforcement of the securities 
laws. 
124. Queen Uno Ltd. Partnership v. Coeur D'Alene Mines Corp., 2 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 
1359 (D. Colo. 1998). 
